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I. INTRODUCTION
HE most significant developments in civil evidence for 2000 oc-
curred in the fields of expert testimony, privileges, and hearsay. In
an effort to aid federal trial courts and practitioners cope with the
vague gatekeeping standards for expert testimony created by Daubert
and Kumho, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended. Texas appel-
late courts provided contradictory decisions in the fields of expert testi-
mony and the application of basic privileges. Witness statements
discoverable last year became privileged in Texas' Second Judicial Dis-
trict. This article cannot encompass every development in the area of
civil evidence, nor can it include every interesting case, but the authors
* B.A., B.B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1987; J.D., cum laude, Southern
Methodist University School of Law, 1990. Michael Shore is a partner with the firm of
Shore*Fineberg, L.L.P., in Dallas, Texas. He specializes in complex civil litigation, repre-
senting plaintiffs in medical malpractice, catastrophic personal injury, and complex com-
mercial cases.
** B.A., cum laude, Texas A&M University, College Station, 1995; M.P.A., Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, 1996; J.D. magna cum laude, Southern Methodist University School
of Law, 2000. Kenneth Shore is a law clerk to the Honorable David Folsom, United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas.
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hope that it will give the reader some idea of significant developments in
vivil evidence during the last Survey period.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Some minor but important changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence
went into effect on December 1, 2000. Rule 103 has been amended to
clarify that "[olnce the court makes a definitive [evidentiary] ruling," a
party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve the issue
for appellate review.] Rule 404(a)(1) now provides that when an accused
attacks a victim's character, he opens the door to allow evidence that he
possesses that same character trait.2 There have also been important
amendments to the rules concerning expert opinions and the authentica-
tion of business records.
A. PRESERVING ERROR & EVIDENTIARY MOTIONS
The amendment to Rule 103 addresses the confusion over preservation
of error related to evidentiary rulings. Previously, conflicting opinions
existed regarding whether a party must renew an objection or offer of
proof at trial to preserve error when a court had ruled prior to trial on a
motion to admit or exclude the same evidence.3 The new rule states:
"Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or ex-
cluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an ob-
jection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal."'4
Under the revised Rule 103, a party must still renew its objections
when the court has (1) reserved its ruling; (2) made a conditional ruling;
or (3) changed a previously definitive ruling.5 Rule 103 requires attorneys
to seek clarification if the definitiveness of an in limine or other eviden-
tiary ruling is in doubt, as the rule does not define "definitive ruling."
Michael Smith noted in his presentation to the Federal Bar Association
1. FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(2) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
2. FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(1) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
3. Compare Tanner v. Westbrook, 174 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]o preserve
error on the admissibility of the [plaintiffs'] experts' testimony, [the defendant] had to
object at trial."); Marceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating "[t]he
general rule in this Circuit is that 'an overruled motion in limine does not preserve error on
appeal'-objection at trial is still required); and compare Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d
186, 189 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The overruling of a motion in limine is not reversible error; only
a proper objection at trial can preserve error for appellate review."), with United States v.
Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a definitive ruling on motion in
limine preserves error and no renewal is required); Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 565
(7th Cir. 1999); Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
"that where the substance of the objection has been thoroughly explored during the hear-
ing on the motion in limine, and the trial court's ruling permitting introduction of evidence
was explicit and definitive, no further action is required to preserve for appeal the issue of
admissibility of that evidence."), and Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket,
Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 324-25 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that no formal objection at trial is neces-
sary where the pretrial motion adequately resolves the admissibility of the disputed evi-
dence "with no suggestion that [the trial court] would reconsider the matter at trial.").




for the Eastern District of Texas that if a lawyer wants a pretrial ruling
that actually admits or excludes evidence, the lawyer should title the
pleading a motion to admit or exclude evidence, ask the court to hold a




Rule 701 now states that a lay witness' opinion testimony cannot be
"based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702." 7 The Advisory Committee Note explains that the
change was made "to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements
set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of prof-
fering an expert in lay witness clothing." 8 This change should place
courts on alert to guard against lay witnesses using "scientific" data to
bolster their testimony.
2. Rule 702
Prior Federal Rule of Evidence 702 stated: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 9 In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,10 the United States Supreme Court inter-
preted Rule 702 to also "[assign] to the trial judge the task of ensuring
that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is rele-
vant to the task at hand."'" Thus, based upon old Rule 702's language
and Daubert/Kumho Tire, a party trying to admit expert testimony had
three hurdles to overcome:
(1) Expert testimony must assist the trier of fact;
(2) The proffered expert must be qualified by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education; and
(3) The expert's testimony must be reliable.
Before analyzing the changes in Rule 702's language, we will examine
these three requirements under the prior language. First, the expert's
opinion had to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or deter-
mine a fact in issue. This means that the opinion must be relevant to the
6. Michael C. Smith, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Evidence and the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas, available at http://
www.rothfirm.com (last visited December 8, 2000).
7. FED. R. EVID. 701 (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
8. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
9. FED. R. EVID. 702.
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. Id. at 579-80.
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facts at issue. 12 Relevance of expert testimony meant that the reasoning
or methodology could be applied properly to the disputed facts. 13 Sec-
ond, the expert had to be qualified in order to testify. The party offering
expert testimony was required to show that the expert possessed a higher
degree of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education than an or-
dinary person.' 4 A lack of specialization, however, did not affect the ad-
missibility of the expert opinion, but only the weight to be given to that
opinion. 15 Furthermore, the focus of the analysis was on the expert's
"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" in the subject mat-
ter upon which he offered testimony and not on his specific title or occu-
pation.' 6 Third, the expert's opinion had to be reliable. Reliability meant
that the "reasoning or methodology underlying the expert's proffered
opinion ... [was] supported by adequate validation to render it trustwor-
thy."'1 7 The Supreme Court listed several factors that trial judges could
consider when determining if the scientific testimony was reliable. The
Daubert factors included, and still include:
(1) Whether the theory or technique has been scientifically tested; 18
(2) Whether the theory or technique has been published or subject to
peer review;]9
(3) The error rate of a particular technique;20 and
(4) Acceptance of the theory in the scientific community. 21
The Daubert Court cautioned, however, that these factors were not a
"definitive checklist or test, '22 and that the gatekeeping inquiry must be
"tied to the facts" of a particular case.23 By making the analysis ex-
12. Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Westberry v.
GislaVed Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1999).
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93; Schudel v. Gen. Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir.
1997); see also Hose v. Chicago N.W. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Rele-
vance means there must be 'a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry' in the
case"); see, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997) (finding experts did
not explain how and why opinions could be extrapolated from animal studies which were
dissimilar to the facts of the case).
14. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a), 702; see also McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038,
1043 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994).
15. Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996); see Holbrook
v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[a]buse of discretion to exclude
testimony simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best
qualified or ... have the specialization that the court considers most appropriate.").
16. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended Dec. 1, 2000); see also St. Martin v. Mobil Explo-
ration & Producing U.S., Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 405-06 (5th Cir. 2000).
17. See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 260.
18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375(D.C. Cir. 1997); Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir.
1995).
19. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; Raynor, 104 F.3d at 1375.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
21. Id. ("Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evi-
dence admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal
support within the community,' may properly be viewed with skepticism.").
22. Id. at 593.
23. Id. at 591.
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tremely flexible, Daubert allows trial courts to decide what factors to con-
sider on a case-by-case basis.
For some time there was confusion as to whether Daubert applied to
testimony based on "technical or other specialized knowledge. '24 The
Supreme Court clarified that issue when it decided Kumho Tire Co.,
LTD, v. Carmichael.25 In Kumho Tire, the Court held that Daubert's
"gatekeeping" duty applies to all expert testimony.2 6 The Supreme Court
also stated in Kumho Tire that the purpose of the reliability analysis is to
ensure that the expert employs the same level of intellectual rigor as
other experts in the same field.2 7
The revised Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.2 8
The Evidence Advisory Committee's (the "Committee") comment
notes for revised Rule 702 state that "this amendment is not intended to
provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every
expert. ' 29 The Committee also explained that it was not attempting to
set procedural requirements for Daubert proceedings and emphasized
that trial courts shall enjoy broad discretion in fashioning their analytical
methods. 30 On its face, however, the revised Rule 702 does add a compo-
nent to a trial court's gatekeeper duties-a quantitative assessment of the
foundations for the expert's opinions.
The three new factors will likely do little to clear up the confusion and
inconsistency in Rule 702's application. The revised rule's first new fac-
tor, whether testimony is based upon "sufficient facts or data," adds un-
24. FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
25. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
26. Id. at 138.
27. Id. at 152.
28. FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
29. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152
(noting that the trial court has discretion "both to avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceed-
ings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for
granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases
where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises")).
30. See id.; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 ("That [abuse of discretion] standard
applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its
ultimate conclusion."); Michael W. Shore, Civil Evidence, 53 SMU L. REV. 699, 701-03
(2000) ("As long as the trial court uses a method that is not arbitrary or capricious in
reviewing expert testimony for relevancy and reliability, the trial court's decision on admis-
sibility should stand on appeal."); Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV.
699, 766 (1998) ("Trial courts should be allowed substantial discretion in dealing with
Daubert questions; any attempt to codify procedures will likely give rise to unnecessary
changes in practice and create difficult questions for appellate review.").
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necessary incentives for advocates to "pile up" foundation evidence,
ensuring Rule 702's application will become more time-consuming and
expensive. The Committee's notes say very little about this requirement
other than it is a "quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. ' 31 Judges
already look at the amount of data analyzed by an expert and then make
their own determination, under an abuse of discretion standard, whether
these facts or data are "sufficient." How has this change helped? It likely
has only ensured that litigants will add excessive amounts of background
data and "foundation" evidence to the trial record to ensure that their
experts are quantatively qualified. This will add cost and time to an al-
ready burdensome and expensive process.
The second and third new factors in revised Rule 702 require the trial
court to first determine the reliability of the principles or methods under-
lying the expert's testimony and then determine whether the expert has
applied those principles or methods reliably to the facts of the case. Thus,
the new rule essentially codifies the Daubert/Kumho Tire analysis. Under
Daubert, the trial court would analyze the relevance and reliability of the
expert's testimony.32 Under Kumho, the trial court was directed to first
analyze the reliability of the principle or method, and then determine
whether the expert "has applied the principles and methods reliably." 33
The Daubert factors had caused some confusion in the lower courts. In
Daubert, the trial court was called upon to analyze the reliability of an
epidemiological and pharmacological studies on whether Bendectin
caused human birth defects. The four Daubert factors are arguably not
relevant when analyzing the reliability most types of experts' testimony.34
Daubert's importance was not its list of factors, but the establishment of
the trial court's gatekeeper function. The decision, however, left the
lower courts in a state of confusion as many strained their analysis of
other types of expert testimony to apply Daubert's reliability factors to all
expert testimony.
The Supreme Court clarified Daubert in Kumho Tire when it stated
that the Daubert factors may not be pertinent in every case and that the
trial judge should determine reliability based upon a "rational methodol-
ogy" specific to each case.35 The Court explained that under Daubert, the
district court's responsibility "is to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, em-
ploys in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that character-
izes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."'36 This left the trial
courts with broad discretion in designing ways to test the reliability of
expert's testimony. Revised Rule 702 reaffirms the trial courts' basic
gatekeeper function created under Daubert and requires the courts to
31. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
32. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
33. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
34. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.




create reasonable and articulated methods for carrying out that function
as outlined in Kumho.
All of the Daubert factors continue to apply: (1) whether the theory or
technique underlying the expert's testimony can be tested; (2) whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publica-
tion; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique and the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's oper-
ation; and (4) whether the expert's theory or technique enjoys "general
acceptance" within a relevant scientific community.37 The Committee
noted the already well-established concept that the Daubert factors are
not exclusive. 38 It then combed through reported opinions to cite differ-
ent factors that courts have considered. These non-Daubert factors listed
by the Committee include:
(1) Whether the expert is "proposing to testify about matters grow-
ing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted inde-
pendent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying. '39
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an ac-
cepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.40
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alter-
native explanations.41
(4) Whether the expert "is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting. '42
(5) Whether the type of opinion the expert would give is one that is
known to reach reliable results.43
While the Committee's notes warn that "no single factor is necessarily
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
38. FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note.
39. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996); Braun v. Lorillard, Inc.,
84 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.5 (noting that some
expert disciplines "have the courtroom as a principal theater of operations" and as to these
disciplines "the fact that the expert has developed an expertise principally for purposes of
litigation will obviously not be a substantial consideration").
40. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that in some cases a
trial court "may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered"); Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass'n, 178
F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that although the expert "utilized a method of
analysis typical within his field, that method is not typically used to make statements re-
garding causation without considering all independent variables that could affect the
conclusion").
41. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Am-
brosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (possibility of some unexplained
causes presents a question of weight, so long as expert has considered the most obvious
causes).
42. Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Kumho,
526 U.S. at 152.
43. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151. Where the discipline itself lacks reliability or credibil-
ity, the fact that the expert's theories or methods are generally accepted in that field does
not render his opinions reliable under Daubert. The Court noted that generally accepted
principles in disciplines such as astrology and necromancy still lack reliability. See id.; see
also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony
based upon "clinical ecology.").
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dispositive of the reliability of a particular expert's testimony,"'44 some
courts may look to the Committee's notes for guidance and treat these
examples as five additional Daubert factors.45
After Kumho Tire, courts began to use two different types of analysis -
one for scientific evidence and one for non-scientific. The difference be-
tween scientific and non-scientific evidence is that scientific evidence is
based upon scientific-principles that can be readily tested under the
Daubert factors, while the nonscientific evidence is based upon technical
or other specialized knowledge acquired through experience or observa-
tion. After Kuhmo Tire, when courts analyzed scientific evidence, they
tended to focus on the reliability of the underlying theory using the
Daubert, or similar factors. When courts analyzed non-scientific evi-
dence, they tended to focus on whether an expert logically applied his
"technical or other specialized knowledge" to the facts of the case. Re-
vised Rule 702 requires courts to analyze both the reliability of the princi-
ple or method and its application to the facts in every case. This may
prove to be a problem for attorneys who seek to present a witness whose
testimony is based upon "technical or other specialized knowledge" to
which the factors listed in the advisory notes may not apply. While the
Committee's notes indicate that attorneys may continue to proceed under
the established DaubertlKumho Tire analysis, the safer course is to organ-
ize the analysis to fit the inquiry as set forth in the Committee's notes and
revised Rule 702.46
The three-part test for admissibility of expert testimony now becomes a
five-part test. The five hurdles to admission of expert testimony under
revised Rule 702 include:
(1) Expert testimony must assist the trier of fact;
(2) The proffered expert must be qualified by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education;
(3) The testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or data;
(4) The testimony must be the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(5) The witness must be applying the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.
Under Rule 104(a), a party may challenge the admissibility of an ex-
pert before trial on any one of these five grounds.47 While this five-factor
44. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
45. A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that the Advisory Committee Notes
are a "useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules." Tome v. United States, 513
U.S. 150, 160 (1995). In his dissent in Tome, Justice Scalia stated that while he has ap-
proved of the use of Notes in the past, "[m]ore mature consideration has persuaded me
that is wrong." Id. at 167 (Scalia, J. dissenting). See also Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S.
29, 41 (1995) (rejecting assumption in Committee note); Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1283, 1302 (1995) ("[T]he Advisory Committee Notes are not just a brick, but
rather a part of the foundation of the wall of evidence, and ought to be regarded as such.").
46. See Smith, supra note 6; see also United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 n.20
(10th Cir. 1999) (noting that proposed Rule 702 requires a "three-part reliability inquiry.").
47. FED. R. EvID. 104(a); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-50.
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test seems to provide a rigid structure under which a narrow-minded trial
court could analyze expert testimony, district judges should remember to
be flexible and develop their own "rational methodology" specific to each
case. 48 "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. '49
3. Rule 703
Courts have been confused regarding to how to treat inadmissible evi-
dence reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming his or her opinion.
Some courts used Rule 703 as a hearsay exception.50 Other courts admit-
ted the underlying facts for the limited purpose of explaining or support-
ing the expert's opinion.5 1 Finally, some trial courts erroneously
permitted experts to bring inadmissible information before the jury with-
out limitation.5 2
Revised Rule 703 now prohibits disclosure of inadmissible evidence re-
lied on by an expert unless its "probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial ef-
fect."' 53 This revision establishes a "presumption against disclosure to the
jury of information used as the basis of an expert's opinion and not ad-
missible for any substantive purpose, when that information is offered by
the proponent of the expert."' 54 Thus, when the expert's proponent seeks
to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence to help explain to the jury his
expert's opinion, the court must carefully weigh the probative value of
the evidence in assisting the jury to understand the expert's testimony
against the potential dangers of the jury misusing the information for
other impermissible purposes. If the trial court decides to allow admis-
sion of such testimony, the court "must give a limiting instruction upon
48. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152-53.
49. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988) (admitting, as
part of the basis of an FBI agent's expert opinion on the meaning of code language, state-
ments of informant); Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft, Co., 634 F. Supp. 137, 142-43 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (holding, as properly admitted under Rule 703, expert's testimony describing hearsay
statements of friends and associates of deceased pilot, in support of opinion that pilot was
under great deal of stress); Durflinger v. Artiles, 563 F. Supp. 322, 327 (D. Kan. 1981)
(admitting, as "validated by Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence," deposition testi-
mony of psychiatrist containing expert opinion and hearsay basis of that opinion).
51. See, e.g., Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319, 323 (10th Cir. 1989)
(noting that inadmissible basis could be considered by jury, but only for purpose of evalu-
ating expert's testimony); Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th
Cir. 1978) (citing Rules 703 and 705 as permitting the disclosure of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay evidence, but only for illustrating the basis of the expert witness opinion).
52. See, e.g., Huthinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722, 724-25 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding revers-
ible error where medical expert was allowed to refer to letters from three prominent physi-
cians, and to testify that his conclusion was consistent with those doctors, because this
tactic revealed hearsay to jury and impermissibly bolstered expert's testimony); see also
Boone v. Moore, 980 F.2d 539, 542 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding harmless error where trial court
allowed report relied on by medical expert to be admitted into evidence).
53. FED. R. EVID. 703 (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
54. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
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request, informing the jury that the underlying information must not be
used for substantive purposes. '5 5 Parties opposing or cross-examining an
expert must be careful not to "open the door" to the admission of other-
wise excludable evidence. Attacks on the foundation of an expert's opin-
ions may allow the expert to disclose the otherwise inadmissible
testimony.
C. FOUNDATION & AUTHENTICATION FOR BUSINESS RECORDS
The 2000 amendments to Rules 803(6) and 902(11), (12) allow all busi-
ness records to be certified or self-authenticated rather than being intro-
duced by a testifying foundation witness, as was previously required. The
old Rule 803(6) business records exception required that the foundation
for the exception be laid by "the testimony of the custodian or other qual-
ified witness."'56 Under the revised rule, such foundation may also be laid
"by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), 902(12), or a statute
permitting certification. '5 7
Rule 902(11) allows for the foundation required for admissibility of "a
domestic record of regularly conducted activity" to be laid "by a written
declaration of its custodian or other qualified person. '58 A party in-
tending to offer a record into evidence under Rule 902(11) must provide
written notice to all adverse parties and make the record and declaration
available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence
to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge the re-
cord's admissibility or the adequacy of the foundation in the declaration.
Rule 902(12) allows for foreign records to be admitted in the same man-
ner, but limits the procedure for foreign documents to civil cases. 59 It
also requires that the declaration be "signed in a manner that, if falsely
made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of the
country where the declaration is signed."' 60 This change was long overdue
and should reduce the expense and time required for trial.
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
There were several notable opinions from Texas courts last year re-
garding expert testimony. The Texas Supreme Court and the Texarkana
Court of Appeals reminded us that juries do not always need experts to
help them determine the reasonableness of someone's actions.61 Texas'
55. Id. See FED. R. Evin. 105 ("When evidence which is admissible as to one party or
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted,
the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.").
56. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
57. FED. R. Evil). 803(6) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
58. FED. R. Evil). 902(11) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
59. FED. R. Evi). 902(12) (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
60. Id.
61. K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. 2000); Park v. Larson, 26 S.W.3d
106 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
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appellate courts also discussed qualifications of experts, stating that trial
courts should focus on an expert's knowledge, training, and experience in
the subject matter upon which he proposes to testify and not on his job
title or specific area of expertise. 62 Finally, two appeals courts addressed
the confusion left in the wake of the Texas Supreme Court's 1997 decision
in Merril Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner.63
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise. ' 64 Two years after the United States
Supreme Court decided Daubert, the Texas Supreme Court in E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson65 adopted Daubert's reliability and
relevancy requirements for determining the admissibility of scientific ex-
pert testimony under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. In Robinson, the
Texas Supreme Court prescribed a list of six factors that trial courts
should consider when determining the admissibility of expert testimony:
(1) [T]he extent to which the theory has been or can be tested;
(2) [T]he extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective
interpretation of the expert;
(3) [W]hether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or
publication;
(4) [T]he technique's potential rate of error;
(5) [Wjhether the underlying theory or technique has been generally
accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and
(6) [T]he non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or
technique. 66
The court added that a particular case may require a trial court to con-
sider other factors to determine scientific reliability.67 Thus, Robinson's
factors are not exclusive.
In Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.,68 the Texas Supreme Court
held that "Rule 702's fundamental requirements of reliability and rele-
vance are applicable to all expert testimony offered under that rule"-not
just scientific expert testimony.69 The difference between scientific and
non-scientific evidence is that the former is based upon scientific princi-
ples that can be readily tested under the Robison factors, while the latter
is based upon technical or other specialized knowledge acquired through
experience or observation.70 When a party seeks to introduce non-scien-
tific expert testimony, the test for admissibility is whether "there is simply
62. Spivey v. James, 1 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
63. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
64. TEX. R. EviD. 702.
65. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
66. Id. at 557.
67. Id.
68. 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
69. Id. at 726.
70. See In re D.S., 19 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
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too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered."'71
With little expert testimony being scientific in the traditional sense of the
word, many Robinson factors do not apply in most cases. Therefore,
courts now analyze the admissibility of most expert testimony under
Gammill. In applying Gammill to expert testimony based upon experi-
ence or other specialized knowledge, Texas courts have conducted de-
tailed analyses of the basis for the expert's opinions and how the expert's
conclusions reasonably relate to the case's disputed facts. It is important,
therefore, that experts provide a detailed description of their experience,
training, and methodology. Furthermore, non-scientific experts should
walk the trial court through each fact upon which they relied and through
each step used in their analysis, clearly demonstrating both how the ex-
perts' opinions were formed and how they relate to the disputed issues in
a manner helpful to the fact finder.
With such emphasis being placed on the Daubert/Robinson relevance
and reliability test, Texas lawyers, when challenging their opponent's ex-
perts, have sometimes overlooked the most obvious requirement-that
the expert's testimony bears on a subject that is beyond the common
knowledge of jurors. During the Survey period, however, at least two
courts seized upon this requirement to exclude expert testimony.
In K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt,72 the Texas Supreme Court held in a per
curiam opinion that the testimony of a human factors expert was unnec-
essary to aid the trier of fact in determining whether K-Mart was negli-
gent. In K-Mart, the plaintiff, Ms. Honeycutt, was injured while in the
checkout line next to the cart corral - the area where carts are kept inside
the store. Normally, two rails separated the checkout line from the carts,
but on that day, the upper rail was missing. Ms. Honeycutt sat on the
lower rail, and a K-Mart employee pushed some additional carts into the
corral causing other carts to move forward and hit her.73 At trial, Ms.
Honeycutt offered the testimony of Dr. Wayne Johnston, a Ph.D. in In-
dustrial Engineering with a specialty in Human Factors and Ergo-
nomics.74 Dr. Johnston planned to testify that (1) the lack of a top rail
was an invitation for customers to sit on the second rail and that the miss-
ing rail was therefore an unreasonable risk and the proximate cause of
the accident; (2) K-Mart failed to properly train its employee in re-
turning the cart; (3) the K-Mart employee did not keep a proper lookout;
(4) K-Mart's failure to replace the top rail constituted negligence; and (5)
Honeycutt was not contributorily negligent.75
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals concluded both that Dr. Johnston
was qualified to testify as an expert and that his opinions were relevant
71. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997) (emphasis added)).
72. 24 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).





and reliable. 76 The Supreme Court stated, however, that the fact that "a
witness has knowledge, skill, expertise, or training does not necessarily
mean that the witness can assist the trier-of-fact," 77 and a trial court
should exclude expert testimony "when the jury is equally competent to
form an opinion about the ultimate fact issues or the expert's testimony is
within the common knowledge of the jury."' 78 The decision dissected
each of Johnston's proposed opinions and noted that none of them were
beyond the common knowledge of the jury. First, the jury did not need
Johnston's assistance to determine whether it was unreasonable to allow
the top railing to remain missing. Second, the jury was capable of deter-
mining the missing railing's role in causing the accident. Third, the jury
could determine whether the K-Mart employee was improperly trained.
Fourth, the jury did not need an expert to tell it the proper way to push a
shopping cart. Finally, the jury was capable of determining on its own
whether the employee or Honeycutt was negligent.79 The K-Mart opin-
ion demonstrates the Texas Supreme Court's general skepticism for
human factors experts, citing several cases in which courts have excluded
their testimony because their opinions did not aid the trier of fact.80
Similarly, in Park v. Larison,81 the Texarkana Court of Appeals ex-
cluded the plaintiff's proposed human factors expert because his prof-
fered testimony did not assist the trier of fact. In Park, the parents of a
boy severely injured in a four-wheeler accident sued the vehicle owners.
Fifteen-year-old Tommy Park went with his friend, Jacob Boles, to Ja-
cob's father's deer lease.82 Jacob's father, Mark, owned the deer lease
with his friend, John Larison. Larison and Boles also jointly owned a
four-wheeler used at the deer lease. Both owners saw the warnings
clearly posted on the vehicle. The warnings stated that anyone who
drives the four-wheeler should (1) wear a helmet; (2) take a safety course;
76. See Honeycutt v. K-Mart Corp., 1 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999,
pet. granted), rev'd, 24 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. 2000).
77. See K-Mart, 24 S.W.3d at 360 (citing Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex.
1996)).
78. Id. See also $18,800 in U.S. Currency v. State, 961 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tex. App. -
Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); Glasscock v. Income Prop. Servs., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 176,
180 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ dism'd); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789
F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[Federal] Rule 702 makes inadmissible expert testimony
as to a matter which obviously is within the common knowledge of jurors because such
testimony, almost by definition, can be of no assistance.").
79. K-Mart, 24 S.W.3d at 361.
80. See Scott, 789 F.2d at 1055 (holding that it was error to permit human factors ex-
pert to testify that women wearing high heels tend to avoid walking on grates); Persinger v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 920 F.2d 1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990) (excluding expert testimony about
whether the weight the plaintiff had to carry was unreasonable because the testimony "did
no more than state the obvious"), Stepney v. Dildy, 128 F.R.D. 77, 80 (D. Md. 1989) ("Nor
is the testimony of a human factors expert required to advise the jury that moisture will
freeze at 32 degrees or colder."); Douglas R. Richmond, Human Factors Experts in Per-
sonal Injury Litigation, 46 ARK. L. REV. 333, 337 (1993) ("[M]any experts misuse human
factors expertise in litigation by either testifying about matters clearly within the jury's
common knowledge or offering opinions without adequate foundation.").
81. 28 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
82. Id. at 108.
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(3) be at least sixteen years old; and (4) not carry a passenger. 83 When
the accident occurred, neither boy was wearing a helmet, they were both
fifteen, neither had taken a safety course, and Matt Park was driving with
Jacob Boles riding as a passenger.84 The plaintiffs sued Larison and
Boles for failing to supervise the boys and for allowing them to ride the
four-wheeler.
The Plaintiffs offered the testimony of Dr. Edward Karnes.85 Karnes
has a Ph.D. in experimental psychology and is a board certified human
factors engineer.86 He had also authored eight published articles on all-
terrain vehicles. 87 These articles reported the results of his tests on the
reaction of adults and adolescents to the vehicles' warning signs. Karnes
proposed to testify that the warnings on the four-wheeler were adequate
to inform an adult of the risks involved in riding the vehicle and that
allowing Matt to ride the four-wheeler under those circumstances, which
violated every warning, was negligent. 88 Karnes also proposed to testify
that adolescents perceive risks differently from adults and that adoles-
cents model their use of the vehicles after adults they observe using it.
Matt Park had seen Boles and Larison ride the four-wheeler without a
helmet and with passengers. Based upon his studies and his observations
concerning the case, Karnes planned to testify that in his expert opinion
Boles and Larison were negligent and that Matt Park was not. The trial
court, however, excluded Karnes' testimony, and the jury found that Matt
was 100% negligent. The trial court entered judgment against the plain-
tiffs. On appeal, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed. 89 The court
stated that Karnes' testimony merely went to whether the conduct of
Larison, Boles, and Matt was reasonable and prudent. 90 "As such, the
expert's testimony involved issues within the common knowledge of the
average juror."9 1
During the Survey period, two cases from the Texas appellate courts
emphasized that trial courts should not dwell on an expert's job title or
particular area of expertise when determining whether the expert is quali-
fied to testify. Instead, the focus of the trial court's analysis should be on
the expert's knowledge, training, or experience in the subject matter
upon which the expert proposes to testify.
In Spivey v. James,92 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion when it excluded the plaintiff's standard of
care and causation expert in a dental surgery malpractice case, even
though the expert had never practiced in the defendant's field.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 109.
85. Id. at 110.
86. See id. at 111.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 114.
90. See id. at 112.
91. Id.
92. 1 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
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The plaintiff in Spivey sued the defendant, an oral surgeon, for a per-
manent injury she suffered to her temporomandibular joint (TMJ) during
oral surgery. 93 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had improperly
inserted a device called a bite block into her mouth, stretching her jaw
joint and muscles out of place.94 The plaintiffs offered Dr. Michael Nee-
ley's testimony as to both the standard of care and causation. Dr. Neeley
possessed a degree in dental surgery and was a licensed dentist; however,
he had never practiced dental surgery.95 Dr. Neeley had examined the
plaintiff, taken her medical history, reviewed her medical records and x-
rays, and reviewed her deposition. Based upon these observations, he
would have testified that the defendant breached the standard of care of
a dental surgeon and that his improper use of the bite block had caused
the plaintiff's TMJ disorder.96 But because he had never practiced as a
dental surgeon, the trial court excluded his testimony.
The appellate court held that the trial court's refusal to allow Dr.
Neely's testimony was an abuse of discretion. The court noted that while
Dr. Neeley had not practiced as a dental surgeon, he had training as a
dental surgeon and was therefore familiar with the standard of care. 97
Furthermore, Dr. Neeley had developed a particular interest in TMJ dis-
orders having been a TMJ patient himself. He had attended continuing
education courses on TMJ disorders and had devoted at least fifteen per-
cent of his practice treating TMJ disorders. The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Neeley's
testimony based upon the fact that he did not practice in the same field as
the defendant without considering Dr. Neeley's other background, train-
ing, and experience. 98
Similarly, in Blan v. Ali,99 the Houston Court of Appeals held that a
trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the affidavit of the
plaintiff's neurology expert after the trial court concluded that the neu-
rologist was not qualified to testify to as the standard of care for a cardi-
ologist's or emergency room physician's treatment of a stroke victim. In
the absence of the neurologist's affidavit, the trial court held that the
plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of a breach of the standard of
care or causation and granted the defendants' summary judgment.1°°
The appellate court analyzed the neurologist's qualifications under
both Rule 702 and the Texas' Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act (the "TMLA"), which outlines the required qualifications to
testify as an expert in a medical negligence case in Texas.10 1 Section
93. See id.
94. Id. at 382.
95. Id. at 384.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 384.
98. See id.
99. 7 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 746.
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14.01(a) of the TMLA states:
(a) a person may qualify as an expert witness on the issue of
whether the physician departed from the accepted standards of med-
ical care only if the person is a physician who:
(1) is practicing medicine at the time such testimony is given or
was practicing medicine at the time the claim arose;
(2) has knowledge of accepted standards of medical care for the
diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition in-
volved in the claim; and
(3) is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an
expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of medical
care.' 
0 2
The plaintiff's neurology expert admitted in his deposition that he was
not familiar with the standard of care of either an emergency room physi-
cian or a cardiologist.10 3 Based upon this admission, the trial court deter-
mined that the neurologist was not qualified to testify as to the standard
of care. The court of appeals stated that to categorically exclude a medi-
cal expert's testimony solely because he is from a different school of prac-
tice than the defendant ignores the criteria set out in Rule 702 and section
14.01(a) of the TMLA.10 4 These standards, the court noted, focus "not
on ... the doctor's area of expertise, but on the condition involved in the
claim.1105 The court stated: "Despite the fact that we live in a world of
niche medical practices and multilayer specializations, there are certain
standards of medical care that apply to multiple schools of practice and
any medical doctor."'01 6 The Blan court further noted that the neurolo-
gist's lack of knowledge of the standard of care for cardiologists and
emergency room physicians would be "persuasive, if not determinative,"
if he were offering opinions in matters particular to those fields.' 07 In this
case, however, the plaintiff's expert was offering an opinion as to the
standard of care that would apply to any physician treating a stroke or
lupus patient-regardless of the physician's particular area of exper-
tise.10 8 Therefore, the Blan court correctly held that the trial court
abused its discretion in excluding his testimony.
While it is common for lawyers to challenge the qualifications of their
opponent's expert when the expert does not practice in the exact same
area as the defendant, it is clear that the challenge should focus on the
expert's experience within the disputed subject matter, and trial courts
should not categorically exclude experts from different fields or areas of
102. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 14.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (emphasis
added).
103. See Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 746.
104. See id.
105. See id. (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 746-47 ("Given [the expert's] testimony that the standard he describes
applies to any physician who undertakes to treat and care for a patient suffering from
stroke, [he] is qualified to testify as to the appellees/doctors' treatment of Blan's stroke.").
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expertise. 10 9 Instead, the trial courts should focus on whether the pro-
posed expert's "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" in
the relevant subject matter will help the jury understand the disputed
issues.' 1 0
In another case, Texas Workers' Compensation Ins. Fund v. Lopez,11 1
the San Antonio Court of Appeals clarified that the statistical guidelines
that the Texas Supreme Court set out in Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals v.
Havner'12 are not hard rules for the admissibility of epidemiological stud-
ies and opinions in toxic tort cases. In Havner, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed a $3.75 million judgment in favor of a child born disfigured as a
result of her mother's taking the morning sickness drug Benectin.' 3 In
rendering a take-nothing judgment, the Supreme Court found that the
plaintiffs' experts' testimony, based in part on epidemiological studies,
was unreliable and therefore no evidence at all. 114 The Havner court
stated that in conducting a legal sufficiency review, an appellate court
should look beyond the expert's testimony to determine reliability.1 1 5
The issue in Havner was the reliability of scientific testimony concern-
ing the cause of the plaintiff's birth defects. The plaintiff's experts relied
partially on epidemiological studies in forming their opinion.116 Before
applying the Robinson factors to the evidence, the court was concerned
with "arm[ing] [itself] with some of the basic principles employed by the
scientific community in conducting studies. ."... ,,7 The Havner court ex-
plained that in toxic tort cases, there is general causation and specific
causation.1 1 8 General causation is whether a substance is capable of caus-
ing a particular injury or condition in the general population, while spe-
cific causation is whether a substance caused a particular individual's
injury. In the absence of direct proof of specific causation, plaintiffs in
toxic tort cases may use epidemiological studies to demonstrate to the
jury an association between the plaintiff's disease or condition and the
drug or substance to which the plaintiff was exposed. 11 9 The court ad-
vised that to be reliable, however, epidemiological evidence should have
a relative risk of 2.0, meaning that the risk of an injury or condition in the
109. See Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 18 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000,
pet. filed). In Wilkins, the trial court allowed an agronomist to testify as to a plant's ability
to tolerate charcoal rot. The opposing party challenged the expert because he was not a
plant pathologist. The court stated that an expert's "occupational status" does not under-
mine his ability to testify if he has experience addressing the issues about which he pro-
poses to testify. See id. at 753-54; see also Nunley v. Kloehn, 888 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D.
Wis. 1995) ("The focus ... is on the 'fit' between the subject matter at issue and the
expert's familiarity therewith, and not on ... the expert's title . .
110. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
111. 21 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
112. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
113. See id. at 706.
114. Id. at 711.
115. Id. at 712.
116. See id. at 708.
117. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 724.
118. Id. at 714.
119. See id. at 715.
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exposed population should be more than double the risk in the unex-
posed or control population.120 The Havner court also noted that the
generally accepted significance level or confidence level in epidemiologi-
cal studies is 95%, which means that if the study were repeated numerous
times, the confidence interval would indicate the range of relative risk
values that would result 95% of the time.121 The court stated that "[t]he
use of scientifically reliable epidemiological studies and the requirement
of more than a doubling of the risk strikes a balance between the needs of
our legal system and the limits of science.1' 22
Because the Havner court focused on the expert testimony's reliability,
subsequent courts have held that the Robinson/Gammill standard applies
both to admissibility under Rule 702 and for an appellate court's determi-
nation of legal sufficiency. 123 The Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that
under Havner, "a defendant has two bites at the same Daubert apple. '1 24
Courts have also held that the statistical guidelines for reliability set forth
in Havner also apply in the trial court's initial determination of reliability
under Rule 702.125
In Texas Workers' Compensation Ins. Fund v. Lopez, 126 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals clarified that Havner did not require that
every study fall within Havner's statistical guidelines in order to be admis-
sible under Rule 702. Lopez claimed that he had developed chronic ob-
structive pulmonary disease (COPD) from exposure to dust and silica
while working as a sandblaster for T.B. Moran Company. The key issue
in the case was causation. At trial, Lopez called board-certified
pulmonologist, Dr. Muhammed Majahid Salim, to testify that exposure to
small particles of silica and dust caused Lopez's COPD. 127 On appeal,
the Fund asserted that Salim's testimony was not scientifically reliable
citing Havner128 Salim based his opinion on two articles that studied the
relationship between occupational dust and COPD. The defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's decision to admit Salim's testimony because these
studies did not meet Havner's requirement that they demonstrate Lopez's
risk of contracting COPD was at least double that of the general
population. 29
120. See id. at 717-18.
121, Id. at 724.
122. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 718.
123. Id. at 714; Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1998, pet. denied); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Court-
house: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causa-
tion Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 376 (1999) (recognizing this and other Texas courts as
having interpreted Daubert as eroding the distinction "between the admissibility of evi-
dence and the sufficiency of that evidence to prove causation").
124. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d at 192.
125. Austin v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 25 S.W.3d 280, 286-87 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2000, no pet. h.).
126. 21 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
127. Id. at 366.
128. Id. at 363.
129. Id. at 365.
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The appellate court correctly distinguished Lopez from Havner. The
Texas Supreme Court had stated in Havner that it did not intend to estab-
lish a relative risk of 2.0 as litmus test-trial courts may consider other
factors. 130 The San Antonio Court of Appeals noted that in Lopez there
were over thirty studies introduced in Havner that concluded that Benec-
tin did not cause birth defects, contradicting the plaintiffs' expert.
"Against this backdrop, the supreme court criticized the Havner's scien-
tific evidence and set a high standard for the use of epidemiological stud-
ies in the face of contrary scientific belief.' 131 The Lopez court then
noted that the scientific evidence was "overwhelmingly in favor of Lo-
pez's proposition," and therefore the studies could not be found unrelia-
ble simply because they failed to meet Havner's statistical guidelines. 132
Lopez correctly teaches that the level of statistical certainty is but one
factor for a court to use in evaluating epidemiological evidence. If the
offered evidence is contrary to or in conflict with other similar studies,
the court may require a higher level of statistical confidence. Lopez's
holding demonstrates the careful case specific analysis of expert testi-
mony required of trial courts post-Robinson and Gammill.
IV. PRIVILEGES
A. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Texas Rules of Evidence 509(c)(1) and 510(b)(1) protect confidential
communications between a physician and a patient relative to the pa-
tient's mental health.133 Rules 509(c)(2) and 510(b)(1) protect the pa-
tient's medical records as well. 134 In In re Doe,135 the Austin Court of
Appeals reaffirmed that a patient does not automatically waive the physi-
cian-patient or mental health privilege by pleading mental anguish dam-
ages. In Doe, a prison guard raped Jane Doe while she was in the Travis
County Community Justice Center. She sued the rapist, the rapist's su-
pervisor, and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation ("Wackenhut"), which
operated the facility. In her petition, Doe alleged that she had suffered
mental anguish. She claimed she was scared of men who look like the
130. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 718 ("[E]ven if a particular study reports a low relative risk,
there may in fact be a causal relationship.").
131. Lopez, 21 S.W.3d at 365.
132. Id.
133. Rule 509 is the physician-patient privilege. Rule 509(c)(1) states: "Confidential
communications between a physician and a patient, relative to or in connection with any
professional services rendered by a physician to the patient are privileged and may not be
disclosed." TEX. R. EVID. 509(a)(1). Rule 510 is the mental health privilege. Rule
510(b)(1) states: "Communication between a patient and a professional is confidential and
shall not be disclosed in civil cases." TEX. R. EVID. 510(b)(1).
134. Rule 509(c)(2) states: "Records of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment
of a patient by a physician that are created or maintained by a physician are confidential
and privileged and may not be disclosed." TEX. R. EvID. 509(c)(2). Rule 510(b)(2) states:
"Records of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient which are created
or maintained by a professional are confidential and shall not be disclosed in civil cases."
TEX. R. EVID. 510(b)(2).
135. 22 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, orig. proceeding).
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rapist, felt uneasy around men, remains jumpy and anxious when people
touch her, and has trouble sleeping. 136 Wackenhut sent Doe discovery
requests seeking Doe's mental health records and the identity of her
treating physicians or therapists. Wackenhut claimed that it was entitled
to this information under the litigation exception to the physician/patient
privilege, or alternatively, the offensive use exception.
The litigation exception to the physician/patient privilege states that
communications or records relating to a particular condition are no
longer privileged when the patient relies upon the condition as part of his
or her claim or defense. 137 The Texas Supreme Court stated in R.K. v.
Ramirez:138
As a general rule, a mental condition will be a " part" of a claim or
defense if the pleadings indicate that the jury must make a factual
determination concerning the condition itself. In other words, infor-
mation communicated to a doctor or psychotherapist may be rele-
vant to the merits of an action, but in order to fall within the
litigation exception to the privilege, the condition itself must be of
legal consequence to a party's claim or defense.1 39
Wackenhut claimed that Doe had mental and emotional problems
before the incident, and if it was not allowed access to her mental health
records, the "jury [would] be left with the faulty impression that Doe was
in perfect emotional health before the incident .... "140 The trial court
agreed and required Doe to answer the discovery. Doe filed a writ of
mandamus to the Austin Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial
court's ruling.
At the court of appeals, Wackenhut cited in support of the trial court's
ruling the Supreme Court's decision in Groves v. Gabriel.141 Wackenhut
claimed that Groves was dispositive to the privilege issue in the case. In
Groves, the plaintiff had brought several claims including one for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 142 The elements of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress are: "(1) the defendant acted intentionally
or recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the actions
of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emo-
tional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe."'1 43 The supreme court
held that since the Groves plaintiff had alleged severe emotional distress,
including "post-traumatic stress disorder," she placed her mental and
emotional condition into issue. 144 Severe emotional distress was an ele-
136. Id. at 610.
137. TEX. R. EvID. 509(e)(4) (stating that an exception to the privilege exists "as to a
communication or record relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condi-
tion of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as part of
the party's claim or defense"); TEX. R. EvID. 510 (d)(5)(same).
138. 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994).
139. Id. at 843.
140. Doe, 22 S.W.3d at 610.
141. 874 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1994).
142. Id. at 660-61.
143. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993).
144. Groves, 874 S.W.2d at 661.
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ment of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and "the
jury [had to] make a factual determination concerning the condition
itself. 145
In Doe, the Austin Court of Appeals distinguished Groves in that the
Doe plaintiff's mental condition did not affect whether or not Wackenhut
was negligent. 146 In addition, she had "not alleged any 'severe emotional
condition' that would place her mental condition in issue so as to trigger
the litigation exception and waive her privilege regarding her mental
health records.' 47
Doe is an important case in that it provides a proper and limited read-
ing of Groves. In any personal injury, especially intentional torts, the vic-
tim will suffer some emotional distress. A plaintiff in such cases should
be able to recover damages for that emotional distress without being re-
quired to waive the physician-patient or mental health privilege gener-
ally. To avoid unfairness, however, the trial court should view the
disputed records in camera to ensure that relevant information is not
withheld. For instance, if the Doe plaintiff's records had indicated a prior
rape or fear of men, they should have been produced. Arguably unre-
lated disorders, like an eating disorder in high school or episodic depres-
sion over a parent's remote death might not be deemed relevant or
discoverable.
In In re Xeller,148 the real party in interest, Richard Locke, a Brown &
Root employee, sued Brown & Root's compensation carrier, Highlands
Casualty Company ("Highlands") and Dr. Charles Xeller, the physician
whom the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commis-
sion") chose to evaluate him under Texas Labor Code sections 408.122
and 408.125. Locke alleged causes of action for bad faith, fraud, and civil
conspiracy claiming that Highlands, Dr. Xeller, and Dr. Xeller's em-
ployer, Medical Evaluation Specialists, Inc. ("MES"), conspired to de-
fraud him by depriving him of deserved workers' compensation benefits.
As part of his case, Locke attempted to subpoena records, correspon-
dence, and payments between Highlands, MES, Dr. Xeller, and other
MES physicians. He also sought Commission reports of medical exami-
nations related to other Brown & Root employees, presumably to show a
pattern of behavior.
Highlands, MES, and Dr. Xeller objected to providing the Commission
reports on other employees as violating the physician-patient privilege
found in Texas Rule of Evidence 509 and Texas Occupations Code sec-
tion 151.001. The employee countered that the litigation exception
should apply to allow the records' production and that a confidentiality
order could protect the patients' rights to privacy. The court correctly
brushed aside the plaintiff's argument, citing the fact that both civil and
145. Ramirez, 887 S.W.3d at 843.
146. Doe, 22 S.W.2d at 610.
147. Id.
148. 6 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).
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criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure could not be overcome by
a confidentiality order, 149 and that the litigation exception only applied
when the patients, not a third party, were involved in litigation related to
their medical condition. 150
The case represents a common sense application of well-established
statutory and constitutional privacy rights.151 The case also makes it clear
for the first time that individual patient's rights to privacy are to be pro-
tected, even in situations where large numbers of patients' information
may be relevant or useful to demonstrate a pattern of illegal activity by a
health insurer, workers' compensation insurer, or health maintenance or-
ganization. Litigants in HMO and insurance bad faith cases should see
this opinion cited several times in the coming years. It remains to be seen
if the reasoning will hold in the class action context where the lawyer may
putatively represent the patients upon the date of filing, but not possess
an express authorization from each for their medical records to be re-
viewed or produced.
B. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
In In re Osteopathic Medical Center,152 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals expanded the medical peer review privilege to documents created
as a result of a hospital slip and fall. After a slip and fall in an Osteo-
pathic Medical Center ("OMC") bathroom, Maxine Erickson filed suit
against the facility. During discovery, OMC asserted the medical peer
review committee privilege to avoid the production of two documents, a
Patient Quality Event Tracking Report (the "Patient Quality Report")
and a Security Services Incident Report (the "Security Report"). After a
hearing and inspection of the documents, the trial court ordered both
produced. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court as to
the Patient Quality Report, but denied protection to the Security
Report. 153
The reasoning used by the court to protect the Patient Quality Report
was simplistic and mechanical. The court emphasized that the Patient
Quality Report was on a pre-printed form that included in bold type the
phrases "For Quality Assurance Committee Use Only," "Do Not Copy,"
"Privileged and Confidential," and "Not Part of [the] Medical Re-
cord.' 54 In addition to the pre-printed, self-serving language on the
form, OMC's counsel offered the affidavit of OMC's peer review commit-
tee chairman. The chairman averred that the committee "evaluates cases
involving patient care" and explained that "incident reports are prepared
149. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495, § 5.08(1) (Vernon 1976 & Supp.
2001); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 402.083, 402.086, 402.091 (Vernon 1996).
150. See Xeller, 6 S.W.3d at 625.
151. See id.
152. 16 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) [hereinafter
"0MC"].




immediately following an unusual occurrence to facilitate the peer review
investigation process. '155 The committee chairman's affidavit went on to
explain that the report was sent to the Hospital Quality Counsel Commit-
tee for analysis and then forwarded to him as chairman of the medical
peer review committee.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals completely misinterpreted the Texas
Occupational Code in protecting the Patient Quality Report. The docu-
ment referenced "the medical and health care provided to Ms. Erickson
by members of ... the staff .... "156 It also described the victim's condi-
tion before and after the fall, a description of events, and the identities of
witnesses. Nothing in the document described the deliberations of a peer
review committee. Nothing in the case indicates that the document con-
tained any comments evaluating patient care.' 57 Nothing in the opinion
indicates that a doctor or other health care provider covered by the privi-
lege caused the bathroom fall. The opinion did indicate that every unu-
sual occurrence (i.e. a slip and fall) would as a matter of facility policy
result in a Patient Quality Report. Despite the fact that every "unusual"
event would result in the creation of a Patient Quality Report, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals concluded that such reports are not made in the
"ordinary" course of OMC's business. 158 In essence, every reaction, even
a reaction required by published policies, to anything "unusual" cannot
be considered within the ordinary course of business. The logic is
astounding.
The Court's emphasis on the pre-printed form's recitation of peer re-
view buzz words also mocks the privilege's real purpose. It is obvious
from the opinion that OMC created the forms to expand the peer review
privilege to any report of an accident, or unusual occurrence on OMC's
premises. To the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, the emperor is apparently
fully dressed.
The shallow analysis is apparent from the opinion's blatantly inconsis-
tent statements. When the Patient Quality Report's use is initially de-
scribed, the court admits it is first forwarded to the Hospital Quality
Counsel Committee, a group whose purpose is never explained in the
opinion. That committee then forwards copies of the Patient Quality Re-
ports to the chairman of the medical peer review committee. Nothing in
the record indicates that the peer review committee ever discusses or con-
ducts deliberations on the reports. The only evidence offered was that
the reports are forwarded to the medical peer review committee chair-
man. Later in the opinion, however, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
inconsistently states, "It is apparent from the face as well as the content
155. Id. at 884.
156. Id. at 886.
157. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 151.002(a)(7) (Vernon 2000) defines medical peer review
to mean "the evaluation of medical and health care services, including evaluation ... of
patient care provided by" those [professional health care] practitioners."
158. The peer review privilege does not protect records made in the regular course of
business. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(c) (Vernon 1992).
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of the Patient Quality Event Tracking Report that it was made exclusively
for the Hospital's medical peer review committee. ' 159 The court justifies
its gross expansion of the medical peer review committee privilege by
ignoring the existence of the group that actually uses the Patient Quality
Reports, the Hospital Quality Counsel Committee. This case stands for
the proposition that a hospital can hide anything under the cloak of medi-
cal peer review if they use the right pre-printed form, send a copy to
someone on the medical peer review committee, maintain the form's con-
fidentiality, and obtain venue in the Second Judicial District.
C. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cornyn,160 the Austin Court of Ap-
peals holds that a lawyer's factual investigation on behalf of a client, if
such investigation was made in the capacity of an attorney primarily re-
tained to provide legal services, is protected from disclosure by the attor-
ney-client privilege found in the Texas Government Code sections
552.107(1) and 552.103.161 The Harlandale Independent School District's
Board of Trustees, (the "Board of Trustees") filed suit against the Texas
Attorney General seeking a declaration that a retained attorney's investi-
gative report of a campus police officer's grievance is excepted from pub-
lic disclosure. 62 When asked for an opinion prior to suit, the Open
Records Division of the Texas Attorney General's office had concluded
that the factual recitations in the report were required to be disclosed to a
newspaper reporter under the Public Information Act. The Attorney
General's opinion did not require the Board of Trustees to disclose the
legal advice and opinions included in the report. 163
The Board of Trustees filed suit in district court claiming that all of the
report should be treated as privileged under the Texas Government Code
section 552.107(1) and 552.103 and Texas Rule of Evidence 503. The dis-
trict court agreed with the Attorney General and ordered the factual reci-
tations in the report disclosed. The Board of Trustees appealed and
prevailed before the Austin Court of Appeals, which held that all of the
report, including the details discovered during the attorney's factual in-
vestigation, were privileged because the "primary" purpose for hiring the
attorney was the Board of Trustee's seeking of legal advice. In reaching
its decision, the Harlandale court looked closely at the Board of Trustee's
reasons for hiring an attorney, as opposed to an investigator. 164
In its decision, the Austin Court of Appeals concedes the long-estab-
lished rule that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to communi-
cations between a client and a person licensed as an attorney if the
159. OMC, 16 S.W.3d at 886 (emphasis added).
160. 25 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. filed).
161. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.107(1), 552.103 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2001).
162. Harlandale, 25 S.W.3d at 329.
163. Id.
164. Harlandale, 25 S.W.3d at 334.
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attorney is being employed in a capacity other than a lawyer, such as an
accountant or notary. 165 The fact-sensitive question for the Austin Court
of Appeals in Harlandale was whether the attorney, Peggy Pou, was re-
tained to act primarily as an attorney or an investigator. After looking at
the evidence closely, the Harlandale court concluded that the school dis-
trict retained Ms. Pou "primarily" for legal advice and that "the investiga-
tive fact-finding was not the ultimate purpose for which she was hired.
166
The proof the Austin Court of Appeals used to reach its conclusion
provides lawyers with an excellent example of circular logic. The court
relies upon an affidavit from one board member stating that although an
investigator was considered, an attorney was chosen expressly because
the Board of Trustees wanted the report to be confidential. 167 The same
logic could be used to hire an attorney to act as an accountant, auditor,
claims investigator, or notary. Instead of looking at the client's desire for
confidentiality as the determining factor, the more reasoned approach is
to look at the attorney's actions.
The Harlandale opinion appears to be at odds with a case reported in
the Survey last year, In re Texas Farmers Insurance Exchange,168 wherein
the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that when an insurance company
hires an attorney to conduct a routine claim investigation, the communi-
cation between the lawyer and insurance company about the results of
the investigation do not fall under the attorney-client privilege.
169
Justices Hecht and Owen penned a stinging dissent to the Texas Su-
preme Court's refusal to hear Texas Farmers, stating, "[t]his sole rationale
of the court of appeals is simply anti-insurer and overlooks the fact that
attorneys in all manner of situations routinely investigate their clients'
claims, hire investigators to do the same, and report the results to the
clients.' 70 Justice Hecht and Owen are correct, but so is Attorney Gen-
eral Cornyn and the Texas Farmers court. The factual recitations in an
investigating attorney's report to a client should be discoverable, but not
the legal analysis that accompanies it. If the legal analysis cannot be dis-
sected or redacted from the actual report, the reasonable alternative is to
allow the factual information in the report to be fully produced in an-
other format, with the court ensuring that no facts are "lost in the transla-
tion.' 171 Justices Hecht's and Owen's dissent in the Texas Farmers case
may in fact be calling for a compromise position similar to the one pro-
posed here - the facts in the report may need to be disclosed in some
manner depending on the availability of the information from other
165. Id. at 332.
166. Id. at 334.
167. Id.
168. 990 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding).
169. Id. at 341.
170. In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch., 12 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2000) (Hect, J. & Owen, J.,
dissenting).
171. Ramirez v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 995 S.W.2d 915, 924 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1999, pet. denied).
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sources, but the actual client communication should, if possible, be held
sacred and inviolate.
In Nguyen v. Excel Corp.,172 the Fifth Circuit reviews a trial court's
order allowing the deposition of defense counsel in an action brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The employees sued Excel,
a meat processing company, alleging that they were entitled to payment
for time spent donning and doffing protective and sanitary clothing and
time spent washing themselves both before and after their shifts. 173 In
partial response to the employees' action, Excel asserted that its actions
in refusing to pay the employees for the donning, doffing, and cleaning
time were not willful because, consistent with 29 U.S.C. § 260, its actions
were in good faith, and Excel had reasonable grounds for believing that
its acts or omissions did not violate the FLSA.174 As part of its efforts to
overcome Excel's good faith defenses, the employees sought the deposi-
tions of Excel's counsel to determine whether Excel could have reasona-
bly relied upon legal advice that the disputed work periods were not
subject to pay.175
Although Excel conceded that it had consulted with its counsel regard-
ing its obligations under the FLSA, it did not assert as part of its good
faith defense under 29 U.S.C. § 260, reliance on advice of counsel.' 76 De-
spite its assertions that it was not relying upon its counsel's advice to
prove its good faith defense, the employees claimed that Excel executives
could not articulate the basis for the company's good faith belief that the
disputed time was non-compensable without first taking breaks in their
depositions to confer with counsel. 177 The employees contended that
they were entitled to depose the lawyers because what those lawyers told
the executives about the FLSA's requirements became part of the execu-
tives' knowledge at the time the good faith defense arose. The executives
did refer to their attorneys' advice generally during their depositions.178
In Excel's appeal of the trial court's order requiring the deposition of
its counsel, the company contended that, "despite the fact that the advice
of counsel might be relevant to the inquiry as a permissible basis of estab-
lishing the good faith defense, [Excel] did not and never intended to raise
reliance-on-advice-of-counsel as support for its good faith defense."'1 79
Excel further argued that "generic" references to reliance on the advice
of counsel in the executives depositions did not waive the attorney-client
privilege. 180
172. 197 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1999).
173. Id. at 202.
174. Id. at 203.
175. Id. at 204.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 209.
178. Nguyen, 197 F.3d at 208.




The employees took the position that any assertion of a 29 U.S.C. § 260
good faith defense requires that every basis of that defense be examined,
not just those bases that the defendant intends to specifically rely upon at
trial. The employees focused on section 260's subjective element, arguing
that if a defendant could pick and choose particular pieces of knowledge
available to it and discard others, the full knowledge of the defendant,
and its true subjective state of mind, could not be known. The employees
relied upon precedents from the Eleventh and Second Circuits holding
that the invocation of the "good faith" defense waives the attorney-client
privilege.181
The Fifth Circuit declined to address the issue of whether assertion of a
good faith defense under 29 U.S.C. § 260 waives the attorney-client privi-
lege. It instead ruled more narrowly that under the facts of the case, Ex-
cel waived the attorney-client privilege under traditional common law
analysis, giving guidance to all Fifth Circuit practitioners about how the
privilege can be waived through deposition testimony. In reviewing the
executives' testimony, the Nguyen court held:
By failing to assert the attorney-client privilege when privileged in-
formation was sought, Excel waived the privilege. Then, Excel selec-
tively disclosed portions of the privileged confidential
communication, thereby implicitly waiving the privilege.... A client
waives the attorney-client privilege, however, by failing to assert it
when confidential information is sought in legal proceedings. In-
quiry into the general nature of the legal services provided by coun-
sel does not necessitate an assertion of the privilege because the
general nature of services is not protected by the privilege. Further
inquiry into the substance of the client's and attorney's discussions
does implicate the privilege and an assertion is required to preserve
the privilege.1 82
The court held that because Excel's executives were allowed to testify
in their depositions in response to questions designed to elicit privileged
information, Excel waived the attorney-client privilege by its failure to
assert objections. The court also held that Excel waived its attorney-cli-
ent privilege by selectively disclosing some confidential
communications.1 83
The Nguyen court next turned to deciding the extent of Excel's waiver.
The Excel executives had disclosed the directions they provided to their
counsel and the legal research undertaken by their attorneys. Objections
were raised by Excel's counsel when the executives were asked to dis-
close the "conclusions" of their attorneys' research. The Nguyen court
held that these objections were "too little, too late," and found that the
disclosed communications were significant enough to require waiver of
the "whole" communication. 184
181. Id.
182. Id. at 206.
183. Id. at 206-07.
184. Nguyen, 197 F.3d at 208.
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The last part of the Nguyen opinion focuses on how discovery of the
attorney-client communications may take place. Excel argued, and the
court accepted, the three factors used by the Eighth Circuit in determin-
ing when and if counsel may be deposed. First, there must be no other
means exists to obtain the information. Second, the information sought
must be relevant and non-privileged. Third, the information must be cru-
cial to preparation of the case. 185 In looking at the first criteria, the court
rejected Excel's argument that the employees' counsel must first re-de-
pose the Excel executives.
In reviewing the trial court's reasons for allowing the defense counsel's
depositions, the Nguyen panel noted that the executives had provided
vague and non-specific answers in their depositions and interrogatory re-
sponses that were "so incomplete and ambiguous that they were without
meaning ... .,"186 Although the panel stated it might have given the exec-
utives another chance to be candid and responsive, the trial court's deci-
sion not to do so did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. 187
The Nguyen court summarily found the information sought, advice
from the lawyers to Excel on whether non-payment of wages for the dis-
puted time periods was legal under the FLSA, both relevant and non-
privileged. 188
The third factor, whether the information sought was crucial to case
preparation, required the Nguyen court to look at the order permitting
the depositions to determine if reasonable limits were placed upon their
scope. The court correctly held that the only evidence in possession of
the attorneys crucial to the issue of the Excel's executives' subjective
knowledge under 29 U.S.C. § 260 was the information provided by the
attorneys to the Excel executives at the time the decision was made not to
compensate employees for the disputed time. Presumably, the execu-
tives' reactions to that information would also be crucial. The court re-
viewed the order allowing the attorneys' depositions to determine if it
limited the testimony subject matter accordingly. The Nguyen court
found that the parts of the magistrate's order requiring the attorneys to
disclose their opinions regarding the case, regardless of whether those
opinions were limited to the good faith defense and regardless of whether
those opinions had yet been communicated to the client, were overly
broad. The court determined that inquiries into areas of work-product
not part of the communications related to the FLSA good faith defenses
and the attorneys' opinions on the merits of the lawsuit were off limits to
the employees' counsel. 189
The Nguyen court obviously believed that attorney-client waivers are
to be assessed on a communication-by-communication and subject-by-
185. Id.
186. Id. at 209.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 210-11.
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subject basis. If part of a communication is disclosed, a determination
must be made if the part is significant enough to require disclosure of the
whole communication. Disclosure of a communication on a particular
topic or issue does not necessarily mean that the entire subject matter of
the attorney-client relationship is open for inquiry. Areas worthy of spe-
cial protection include attorney work product and mental impressions.
Key elements in determining waiver and the extent of waiver are whether
the information is relevant, and if so, crucial to the parties' presentation
of their case.
In In re Fontenot,190 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a ques-
tionnaire/narrative sent by a physician to his medical negligence liability
carrier prior to suit being initiated was not a "witness statement" discov-
erable under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(h), but was instead
privileged under Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(1)(B) and (D). In doing
so, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals ignored the literal language of Rule
192.3(h) and two of its sister courts that came to the opposite conclusion.
Rule 192.3(h) states in relevant part:
A party may obtain discovery of the statement of any person with
knowledge of relevant facts-a "witness statement"-regardless of
when the statement [is] made. A witness statement is (1) a written
statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved in writing by the
person making it, or (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other type of recording of a witness's oral statement, or any substan-
tially verbatim transcription of such a recording.191
The rule is clear that parties to a suit are to be included. The applica-
tion of the rule to statements like the one at issue in the case was simple
and straightforward in In re Jimenez,192 In re Team Transp., Inc.,193 and
In re W & G Trucking, Inc.194 To support its incorrect and legally base-
less decision, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals makes the following slip-
pery slope argument:
To make a physician's confidential communications with his malprac-
tice insurer and attorneys during that time period discoverable would
not only have a chilling effect on the free flow of information be-
tween a client and his attorney or legal representative, but also de-
feat the purpose of the statutory scheme by increasing litigation and
insurance costs. 195
The above statement on its face is nonsensical. Litigation cannot be
"increased" by holding that documents created prior to litigation must be
produced after litigation is filed as a part of Rule 192's disclosure require-
ments. The issue only arises in the case of filed suits, so cases evaluated
and settled before trial have no relevance to the analysis.
190. 13 S.W.3d 111 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).
191. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(h) (emphasis added).
192. 4 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).
193. 996 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).
194. 990 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, orig. proceeding).
195. In re Fontenot, 13 S.W.3d at 114.
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The court also implies that making well-defined witness statements dis-
coverable is the equivalent of making "a physician's confidential commu-
nications" discoverable. 196 The assumption is both simplistic and untrue.
Rule 192.3(h) does not cover all communications, only written and/or re-
corded statements. A physician can communicate freely with his insurer
without worrying about Rule 192.3(h) by telephone, direct discussions,
and other methods.
The Fontenot court also seems to want to create a new privilege, the
insurer/insured pre-suit investigation privilege. The Fontenot court ap-
parently believes that communications between a potential client and rep-
resentative of a potential client are privileged, as it holds the insurance
company was a "client representative" under Texas Rule of Evidence
503(a)(2)(A). 197 To be a client representative, the client must have al-
ready formed an attorney-client relationship with an attorney. Nothing in
the record or opinion indicates such a relationship existed at the time the
insurer received the physician's questionnaire/narrative. The fact that
previous correspondence to an attorney was enclosed with the question-
naire/narrative does not make the physician a client or the insurer a client
representative. The Fontenot court simply assumes an attorney-client re-
lationship existed because the insurer was burdened with an obligation to
provide the insured physician with a legal defense under his insurance
policy. 198 The record is void of any evidence that the defense was actu-
ally being provided at the time the questionnaire/narrative was mailed.
The insurance company desiring to protect a statement from a client
should tell its insured not to send written communications on the matter
until a lawyer has been retained. Once a lawyer is retained and an attor-
ney-client relationship is established, the communications between the at-
torney and the client, even if thereafter forwarded to the insurer, should
be covered by the attorney-client privilege. If an attorney has not yet
been retained for the purpose of handling the claim for the physician, no
attorney-client relationship can exist, so the insurance company cannot
be a "client representative" under Texas Rule of Evidence 503(a)(2). The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals holding that an insurance company is a cli-
ent representative simply because it possesses an obligation under an in-
surance contract to provide a defense to any suit subsequently filed is
legally unsupportable, denigrates the very relationship it seeks to protect,
and creates a new privilege, the insurer/insured privilege.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of civil evidence jurisprudence continues. The twin
goals of limiting the use of evidence deemed irrelevant or unreliable and
maintaining the integrity of our jury system still pull against one another
at times. Some courts and judges still express fundamental doubts about
196. Id.
197. Id. at 113.
198. Id.
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the competence of peer juries and our founding fathers' faith in the jury
as the best representative of societal values. On balance, however, recent
opinions indicate the desire to curtail the right to trial by jury is ebbing in
favor of the more enlightened and traditional approach.
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